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Abstract
Th is article considers the activities of international, 
humanitarian NGOs in Syria focused on Iraqi migrants. 
Th e analysis questions how these INGOs were positioned 
towards modern state sovereignty, and sovereignty’s par-
ticular constructions of territory, population, and govern-
ment. Arguing that most INGOs operated fi rmly within the 
social relations stipulated by modern sovereignty, the arti-
cle uses rich ethnographic data to demonstrate how INGO 
activities treated Iraqis according to sovereign exclusions 
and ideas about citizenship, even though Iraqi life in Syria 
visibly contradicted these ideas. Only smaller, amateur 
INGOs that stood outside of the professional humanitarian 
sector were found to work outside of sovereignty’s norms.
Résumé
Cet article se penche sur l’activité des organismes interna-
tionaux non gouvernementaux humanitaires auprès des 
migrants irakiens présents en Syrie. On y analyse comment 
se positionnent ces ONGI quant au discours et aux politi-
ques de l’état moderne, et en particulier en rapport avec 
ses conceptions relatives à la construction du territoire, à 
la population et au gouvernement. On y soutient que dans 
la majorité des cas, les ONGI travaillent pleinement dans 
le cadre de la structure sociale obéissant à ces conceptions 
renforcées par l’état souverain, incluant des conceptions 
d’exclusion et de citoyenneté. Les riches données ethnogra-
phiques étudiées permettent à l’auteur de montrer com-
ment les activités des ONGI ont conséquemment traité les 
irakiens selon ces représentations d’exclusion et de citoyen-
neté, même si la vie irakienne en Syrie les contredisait en 
pratique. Seules les OGNI plus petites, moins expérimen-
tées et actives hors du réseau humanitaire professionnel 
semblent avoir travaillé en-dehors de ces conceptions.
Despite their variety, all humanitarian, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) need to position themselves towards state sovereignty, 
in their management of the limits and opportunities that 
sovereign exclusions and boundaries pose for their oper-
ations. Th is article demonstrates how a small number of 
very diff erent INGOs, all involved in the management of 
Iraqi migrants in Damascus, embedded themselves in the 
particular relationships of bureaucracy, money, emotion, 
and violence that, partly, constituted state sovereignty in 
this context. Th e article argues that INGOs played a small, 
but key, role in constructing state sovereignty vis-à-vis the 
potentially sovereignty-disturbing event of Iraqi migration. 
Field research found only small instances of “anti-sovereign” 
practices among NGO workers, which transcended the 
framework of social relations imposed by sovereignty.
Th is article is situated in the fi eld of critical IR litera-
ture, which has in the past two decades attempted to apply 
Foucauldian methods in order to show how the lived reality 
of state sovereignty is created through minute practices of 
daily life.1 Migration, especially forced migration, has been 
recognized by critical IR scholars as a key area of contesta-
tion to the spatial and political organization of state sover-
eignty.2 Migration therefore provides an exceptionally rich 
fi eld of study for daily-life practices through which migrants 
are managed and channelled into sovereignty-conform 
modes of life. Th e particular contribution of this article 
lies in the rich ethnographic detail that it provides to show 
how this managing and channelling of migrants is achieved 
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through non-state agents, through practices of power that 
frequently lie in highly personalized interactions in areas 
of life not generally considered as the remit of state power. 
As this article shows, this development does not result in a 
diminishing of state sovereignty, but in a transformation of 
the modes of power and locations through which it becomes 
the hegemonic way of ordering society. As this article also 
shows, the diff usion of agents and loci of power that enable 
state sovereignty in fact make it harder to oppose, than when 
all or most power emanates from state institutions. Syria, 
where the liberal forms of power exercised by international 
NGOs were new, as the state had for decades used more vis-
ible techniques of violence and insecurity to rule, was a par-
ticularly interesting setting to study such transformations.
Th e notions of “sovereignty” and “sovereign power” are 
complicated by the overlapping ways in which they are 
deployed in a variety of social science literature to describe 
diff erent concepts. In this article, “state sovereignty” 
describes the social, spatial, and political organization that 
is created by, and creates, the international system of sover-
eign states, as well as the domestic sovereign order of indi-
vidual states. Th is organization rests on the one hand on the 
hegemonic belief that a unity of territory, government, and 
population—each bound to each other through politics of 
representation—is the natural and correct way for human 
life to be ordered on a global scale. Th is hegemonic belief 
is referred to in this article as the “sovereign ideal.” On the 
other hand, state sovereignty rests on an enormous range 
of behaviour—practices—that transmits the sovereign ideal 
into the lived reality of daily life. Th is article mobilizes 
detailed ethnographic fi ndings to show how exactly such 
practices, that turned hegemonic ideas about state sover-
eignty into lived power relations, worked in the interactions 
between Iraqi migrants, the Syrian state, and international 
NGOs. Governments—and, as this article will show, also 
a range of other actors—rely on a variety of techniques of 
power to instruct and coerce human beings into behaviour 
that accords with the demands of state sovereignty. What 
Foucauldians refer to as “sovereign power,” i.e. the violent, 
spectacular punishment of digressions against the ruler, is 
one such technique. To avoid confusion, this article does 
not use the phrase “sovereign power” in this way. In this 
article, “sovereign” refers to the idea that the state should 
be the exclusive arbiter of life on its territory and over its 
population.
Th e fi nal, sovereignty-related point of importance to 
clarify in the context of this article is the dynamic inter-
action between international and domestic space. While 
domestic space encompasses actual, geographical locations, 
the “international” is necessarily imagined and conceptual. 
Th e international is a purely imaginative construct that is 
acted out through particular behaviour and performances 
in geographical locations that necessarily belong to the 
domestic sphere of some state. Interestingly, as the clashes 
between the way that international NGOs constructed Iraqi 
migrants and the way these were integrated by the Syrian 
government made clear, while the practices that construct 
the “international” are closely related to the idealized ver-
sion of state sovereignty as the territory-government-popu-
lation triptych, the practices that enforce domestic sovereign 
orders are much more varied and context-dependent. Th is 
means that while acting as members of the “international 
community,” NGO workers or state offi  cials behave accord-
ing to the notions of the “sovereign ideal,” as if the ideal-
ized social relations of unifi ed territory, governance, and 
population were a universal, lived reality. Yet when acting 
as members of a specifi c domestic order, people adjust to the 
particular techniques of power that are prevalent under dif-
ferent governments: the manner of rule in Germany is very 
diff erent than that in Syria.
Professional INGOs were prevented by the Syrian gov-
ernment from amassing knowledge about the Iraqi popu-
lation and could not conduct the “needs-assessments” that 
usually form the basis of aid projects. INGOs in Damascus 
thus based their interventions largely on assumptions about 
the Iraqi population, which fl owed from established ideas 
and tropes about refugees, intimately connected to sover-
eignty and sovereign exclusions.3 In this way INGO prac-
tices revealed how the “sovereign ideal” of territory, nation, 
and government informed techniques of migration man-
agement, which in turn reproduced this ideal.
Th e results from fi eld research lead to the conclusions that 
INGO activity transformed such social developments that 
destabilized sovereignty (in this case Iraqi migration) into 
sovereignty-conform situations. INGOs operated within 
the territorial and population divisions of sovereignty and 
maintained them. While in general INGO activity may 
weaken the stability and power of particular governments 
and may have a transformative eff ect on the micro-relations 
through which sovereignty is constructed, there appears to 
be no indication that, especially in the humanitarian fi eld, 
INGOs weaken the ideal of sovereignty and the forms of 
power that fl ow from it.4
Empirically, this article is based on direct observations of 
INGO activities in Damascus, as well as “indirect” observa-
tions obtained through conversations and interviews with 
Iraqi migrants, foreign and Syrian INGO staff , and foreign 
UN staff . INGO documentation about activities for Iraqis 
in Syria, such as websites, funding proposals, and annual 
reports, was widely consulted and analyzed, to understand 
how the ideas and attitudes expressed in these documents 
related to INGO practices.
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Th is article is divided into four main parts. Th e fi rst sec-
tion will give an overview of INGO activity focused on Iraqi 
refugees in Damascus. Th e second section analyzes the 
practices of professional INGOs that were offi  cially regis-
tered with the Syrian state and characterized by the ideas 
and language of professional humanitarianism. Th e third 
section concentrates on unoffi  cial, semi-professional, or 
amateur INGOs that ran projects for Iraqis. Displaying a 
greater variety of approaches, these organizations’ positions 
towards sovereignty was eclectic; sometimes confi rming, 
sometimes undermining sovereignty. Th e article closes 
with a conclusion aiming to summarize the most important 
elements of the analysis.
1. Another Consequence of the Invasion of Iraq: 
INGOs in Damascus
Th e link between post-2003 Iraqi migration to Syria and 
the sudden and unexpected expansion of INGO presence 
in Damascus has been noted repeatedly.5 Th is expansion, 
made possible chiefl y through the construction of Iraqi 
migration as a humanitarian catastrophe and the lobby-
ing eff orts of international advocacy organizations, was 
also linked to political developments in Syria, such as a 
growing openness among prominent government fi gures 
towards foreign NGOs and their role in economic develop-
ment.6 Th e rapid and large-scale funding provided by North 
Atlantic states to UNHCR Syria for its Iraqi program, and 
UNHCR’s need to fi nd implementing partners to run pro-
jects, increased the pressure on the Syrian government to 
allow the registration of INGOs.7 Consequently, by 2009–
10, 13 INGOs were established as partners to UNHCR in 
Damascus; and around half a dozen church organizations 
(with international links) and a small number of private or 
less offi  cial international organizations operated independ-
ently.8 No public register for organizations working with 
Iraqi migrants existed, and despite increasingly stream-
lined, bureaucratic registration processes, (I)NGOs still 
maintained various channels with the state to authorize 
their activities.9 My research collected information on 10 
very diff erent INGOs, to varying extent. On two occasions, 
I was able to conduct repeated and intensive participant 
observations; on four occasions, in-depth interviews plus 
limited observations; at other times information was col-
lected through informal conversations and/or interviews 
with INGO staff , benefi ciaries, or third parties.
INGO projects ranged from professionalized services 
delivered by experienced, large organizations, to semi-pri-
vate projects run by amateurs. Apart from the divergence 
among INGOs in terms of programs, staff , and set-up, a 
common thread was that their operations established Iraqis 
as recipients of either goods or services. Th e stated reasons 
for the delivery of goods/services was that Iraqis needed 
assistance and help to survive, and to lead meaningful and 
healthy lives, as reported by the numerous INGO reports 
on the needs and suff erings of the Iraqi community in 
Syria.10 Th is “needs-based” view of Iraqi life was also the 
standard argument with which INGOs justifi ed funding 
requests, and was the general perspective that at least the 
professional INGOs used in their aid projects worldwide. 
In Damascus, professional INGOs generally maintained a 
centrally located head offi  ce, but conducted their operations 
in Iraqi-populated suburbs, such as Saida Zainab, Jaramana, 
or Yarmouk, more rarely also in cities outside Damascus 
such as Homs and Aleppo. Smaller, less formal INGOs were 
run from private fl ats, church facilities, or with no central 
location. Th e range of programs broadly covered medical 
help, education, leisure activities, and the building of infra-
structure (new schools or hospital facilities).11
Accessing INGOs in Damascus proved diffi  cult dur-
ing fi eld research. Other than I had expected, the sudden 
enlargement of the INGO sector had not led to increased 
ease of communication and transparency. Instead, many 
INGO employees, especially those of large organizations 
with little experience in Syria, were too worried about state 
surveillance to meet me, despite the very general and rela-
tively non-controversial focus of my research. While initially 
frustrating, these experiences became valuable information 
in their own right, as they expressed ways of control and 
self-preservation exercised by INGO employees, and related 
to questions about Syrian state sovereignty.
2. Professional Humanitarian INGOs
Professional INGOs were those organizations that already 
had a large portfolio of aid projects in Asia and Africa, and 
for which Syria simply represented the entry into a new 
“market,” where previous experiences could be adapted and 
rolled out. For these organizations, which formed part of 
the global, professional humanitarian sector, entry into 
Syria was simply an expansion of their existing programs 
elsewhere. As will be argued and demonstrated, their prac-
tices, beliefs, and set-ups intimately connected them to the 
political, social, and spatial organization of the sovereign 
ideal of a unity of territory, government, and population, 
as well as the idea that the government-citizen relationship 
is one of mutual rights and duties, and protection. Such 
organizations included Danish Refugee Council, Terres des 
Hommes, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and 
Première Urgence, established bureaucratic apparatuses and 
players in the global humanitarian sector.12 Th eir modus 
operandi included standardized regulatory requirements, 
including a degree of transparency, fi nancial accountability, 
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and bureaucratic continuity, which signifi cantly infl uenced 
their interactions with the Syrian state.13
One of the few professional INGOs that responded to my 
requests for an interview was the IRC, one of two US-based 
INGOs operating in Damascus.14 Th e interview took place 
at IRC’s inconspicuous offi  ce behind a main road in central 
Damascus, located in a typical, French-style Damascus fl at 
on the fi rst fl oor, with wide stone fl oors and high windows. 
Th ree employees, two Syrian, one European, provided me 
with an overview of the organization’s activities with Iraqi 
refugees, which at that time consisted of projects in the edu-
cation sector. IRC was renovating and improving a number 
of schools in deprived suburbs and off ering remedial classes 
for Iraqi pupils.15
Th ree main ideas emerged from the interview: fi rstly, 
that Iraqi pupils faced problems when trying to attend 
school in Syria and in turn created problems for the edu-
cation sector; secondly, that Syria was a new and diffi  cult 
context for IRC to operate in due to the control exercised by 
state institutions; and thirdly, that funding constraints and 
opportunities were a central concern for IRC. Th e expatri-
ate director conveyed a businesslike attitude, focused on the 
managerial challenges faced by IRC such as the obtaining of 
funds, the hiring of staff , and compliance with government 
regulations.
A Deviant Population
One of the Syrian staff  explained that there were around 1.5 
million Iraqi refugees in Syria and that 60 percent of Iraqi 
children did not attend school, adding:
As you might have read, Syrian schools suff ered from overcrowd-
ing. First, the Iraqis face many challenges when it comes to school-
ing. For example, with the English language, in Syria we start in 
year one, whereas in Iraq they only start in year seven, so there is 
a very big gap there. Th en there are the fi nancial problems, this is 
probably the biggest problem. Oft en children have to work and 
families live off  their wages.16
Th is rhetoric closely refl ected the language and informa-
tion about Iraqis on IRC’s website and the organization’s 
press releases and reports.17 Iraqis in Syria were presented 
as hopelessly troubled and in desperate need of the world’s 
attention and aid. IRC’s language was, even compared to 
that of other NGOs, extreme in this regard; however, it 
nevertheless represented broadly the tone of most INGO 
publications on Iraqi refugees, as illustrated by the selection 
of texts below.
Th e Danish Refugee Council’s website depicted Iraqi life 
as follows (similar wording in the organization’s quarterly 
reports):
Humanitarian needs
Due to their illegal status, the Iraqi refugee population in Syria is 
facing a diffi  cult situation being both illegal and out of funds, and 
their possibilities of living a decent life are limited. Th e infl ux of 
refugees has created additional infl ation and pressure on the job 
market in the country. Criminality has increased, and prostitu-
tion of young Iraqi women in need of cash support has become a 
reason for resentment by the host community. Th e Syrian educa-
tion system is also struggling to cope with the increased numbers 
of children and the access to secondary or tertiary health care sys-
tems for Iraqis with chronic diseases is very limited.18
Th e website of Terres des Hommes Switzerland, which sup-
ports a number of health-projects in Syria, carries the fol-
lowing description:
Regional assistance to Iraqi refugees
Th e Iraqi groups who have taken up temporary refuge in Syria 
and Jordan are in great distress. Th ey have very few rights and no 
access to adequate services, in particular in the fi eld of psychol-
ogy. However, this is where their needs are greatest because of the 
trauma experienced during the war, while fl eeing and also during 
their stay in the country which has taken them in. TdH is provid-
ing psychological and social help to these children and their fam-
ilies in Jordan, where it has opened a centre. Two partner relief 
organizations are working in Syria.19
Th ese images of Iraqi migrants, which are focused exclu-
sively on the negative elements of their life and migration 
experience, cast the population as problematic and in need 
of correction. Th e notable focus on psychological trauma 
and sexual deviance (an oft en repeated trope in INGO 
publications on Iraqi refugees) located Iraqis’ problems 
fi rmly inside their own minds and bodies, implying and 
highlighting the need for interventions targeting Iraqi 
lives and individuals, rather than the external, political 
circumstances that were contributing to Iraqi poverty. 
Unsurprisingly, this was indeed the form that many profes-
sional INGO projects took.
Crucially, the connection between Iraqis’ problems and 
the fact that they were migrants/refugees was made through-
out these texts. Emphasis was placed on the assumed illegal-
ity of Iraqis in their states of exile and their lack of rights. 
Th e act of migration to another state, and the existence as 
a refugee, was portrayed as an existence of last resort, an 
unnatural existence, as it placed Iraqis outside of the sover-
eign norm, according to which humans must reside on the 
territory of a government off ering them a legally binding 
relationship of rights (which the Syrian government, which 
operated a policy of renewable, temporary residency per-
mits in addition to tolerating transgressions against work 
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prohibitions and outdated permits, did not).20 Crucial to 
the argument of this article were the implicit and explicit 
constructions of state sovereignty as the accepted, correct, 
and existing political organization that emerged from these 
statements, and the assumed impossibility of a good life 
outside the home state. Th ese constructions implied that a 
clear, legal connection to a protective sovereign state were 
a fundamental requirement for leading a secure and stable 
existence. Th e act of crossing state borders was understood 
as outside the norm and only to be taken in extreme cir-
cumstance, with severe consequences such as illegality and 
the need for outside help.  Iraqi existence outside of Iraq’s 
territory was not taken as an indication of the lack of truth 
of the stipulated, sovereign unity of government, territory, 
and population, but as a wrong, bad, and dangerous state 
of aff airs that needed to be corrected so that the (fi ctional) 
correct, good, and safe situation of sovereignty could be 
regained.
INGO rhetoric and practice was here fi rmly within the 
discourse of the modern ideal of sovereignty and neither 
weakened nor deconstructed it. Descriptions of Iraqi activ-
ities in exile that contradicted the sovereign ideal, and that 
placed into question the notions of sovereign legality, cit-
izenship, and nationality, were absent from INGO rhetoric 
and, broadly, from their programs—even though such activ-
ities were highly visible in Damascene suburbs at the time. 
Despite the troubled situation in their society of origin and 
their oft en horrible recent past, Iraqis in Damascus were 
also thriving: through their own strength and due to a pol-
itical, social, and cultural context that did not produce them 
as hopeless, non-sovereign outsiders. But in INGO texts, the 
natural and ideally best location for Iraqis was the territory 
of Iraq and the sovereign space of the Iraqi state, and it was 
only highly exceptional circumstances that had undone this 
natural and baseline situation. Th rough this selective por-
trayal of Iraqi existence in Syria, INGOs strengthened the 
construction of the sovereign ideal in a context where the 
lived reality of Iraqis in Syria placed it in question.
State-NGO Relations
Returning to the IRC interview, the second important 
point concerning professional INGOs and sovereignty that 
emerged was the interaction between IRC and Syrian state 
institutions. When I asked whether I could visit one of their 
projects, IRC’s expatriate director warned me:
Th is is not a regular environment for NGOs, I will request 
approval and I’m sure that there will not be a problem but we will 
have to see. In a diff erent context we would take you along and 
show you everything, but here … 21
Th e IRC interlocutors explained that their actions 
were closely monitored by offi  cials from the Ministry of 
Education, with whom they met every week to discuss 
progress and to request approvals. Aft er broad approval 
had been received, further requests had to be made regu-
larly even for small activities, such as distributing leafl ets to 
inform Iraqi students about projects.
Th e schools that IRC was rebuilding and renovating, 
located in the suburbs Harasta, Qudseya, and Bila, had 
been chosen by the Ministry of Education, rather than by 
an independent needs assessment. Concerning the infor-
mation and statistics about Iraqi pupils, according to which 
the schools had been identifi ed (Syrian government statis-
tics are notoriously poor and/or non-existent), the IRC staff  
explained that it was not easy to get information, as the sta-
tistics of the ministry were old, and that IRC used a mixture 
of government and UNHCR statistics for their purposes. 
Th e knowledge and fi gures about Iraqis, which IRC staff  so 
confi dently provided, thus appeared largely as assumptions, 
rather than empirically researched. In this particular case, 
IRC’s choices and projects were so closely related to those of 
the ministry that the boundary between governmental and 
non-governmental appeared blurred.
Th e close monitoring and control exercised by Syrian 
ministries over INGO activities and knowledge was fur-
ther described in an insightful report by the Middle East 
Institute, as illustrated by the following extract, describing 
INGO registration procedures:22
One condition to be accredited is to present proof that the organ-
ization is fully funded. Th e second step is to submit a project 
proposal to SARC without being able to a conduct preliminary 
needs assessment. Aft er SARC approves the proposal, it signs 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the INGO. Th e 
MoU was particularly challenging for the fi rst INGOs that signed 
agreements with SARC: these agreements included the obligation 
for INGOs to share a common bank account with SARC, and the 
need for SARC’s approval for any disbursement or the payment 
of 2 percent of the NGOs’ budget to SARC in compensation for 
expenses related to the partnership.  A few months later, these 
fi nancial arrangements were lift ed aft er SARC realized that they 
were time consuming, impractical, and unacceptable by donors 
and INGOs [sic].23
Th e described restrictions partly explained the reluctance 
of INGO representatives to meet with me as a researcher. 
More importantly, the quote demonstrates that professional 
INGOs transported norms, ideas, and behaviours onto 
Syrian territory, which were diff erent to those expected by 
state offi  cials. Further, the highlighted tensions show how 
clashes and squabbles over the “way to do things” could lead 
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to changes in practices and beliefs on both sides, resulting 
in new micro-practices that could gradually produce social 
and political transformations to the way the Syrian govern-
ment was able to enforce the Syrian state’s sovereignty over 
its territory and the people residing on it.
Th e importance of the tense relationship between profes-
sional INGOs and Syrian state institutions for analysis of 
sovereignty concerned both the domestic and international 
sovereignty of the Syrian state. Domestically, INGO pro-
grams and procedures changed, on a minuscule level, the 
way state institutions intervened in private lives in Syria, 
introducing new forms of power into the sphere of Syrian 
domestic sovereignty. INGO projects developed new public 
spaces, which remained heavily state controlled, through 
the operation of community centres or women’s shelters, 
and ran unprecedented programs focused on the inner life 
of individuals, such as psychosocial counselling or parent-
ing skills. Th ese new forms of social organization and inter-
ventions included new governance techniques, in which 
the Syrian state appeared in various, and new, forms. For 
example, the existence of foreign and Syrian INGO staff , 
and spaces associated with INGOs, created new opportun-
ities for state offi  cials to demonstrate the state’s presence in 
these newly created domestic spheres. Again, INGO activ-
ities thus did not weaken the sovereignty of the Syrian state 
over Syrian territory; however, they changed the way this 
sovereignty could be performed and experienced.
Professional INGO programs also introduced a strict 
conceptual distinction between Iraqi and Syrian “bene-
fi ciaries,” as their project proposals and reports stipulated 
percentages for both. Th is practice made the national div-
ision, a key organizing principle of modern sovereignty, vis-
ible and fi xed to all involved in the programs and elevated 
it to new importance.24 Particularly in the fi eld of education 
projects, the continued distinction made between Syrian 
and Iraqi children, the latter described as the reason for the 
overcrowding of schools, was striking. To use the example 
of Première Urgence’s description of its school rehabilita-
tion program, in an announcement concerning the comple-
tion of two new school buildings:
Th ese two schools, with a capacity to host 1.050 pupils, will allow 
the development of a response to the overcrowding of Syrian 
public schools and will promote the enrolment of Iraqi refu-
gee children. Over 33.500 Iraqi children are enrolled in Syrian 
schools and over 75% of these are attending schools in the greater 
Damascus region. ( … )
“We are proud of this result and are now eagerly looking forward 
to the creation of educational programmes with the support of 
the Syrian ministry for education, with the goal to ensure the 
future of Syrian and Iraqi children” explained Sandar Bachrach, 
Première Urgence’s chief of mission in Syria.
In this text, Première Urgence is not simply concerned 
with easing the lives of disadvantaged youngsters, but is 
also focused on promoting a distinction between Iraqi and 
Syrian children. Th e reference to overcrowding and the fi g-
ures, percentages, and locations of Iraqi children imply that 
Iraqi children are somehow alien to the Syrian education 
sector. Given that the raison d’être of INGOs’ presence in 
Syria was the existence of “alien,” Iraqi refugees, promoting 
their distinction was in fact existential to these organiza-
tions. Th is observation again points out that INGOs work-
ing on refugee issues were closely bound to the exclusions of 
sovereignty, rather than standing outside or even opposed 
to such exclusions. In the Syrian context, what made these 
INGO practices all the more striking were how they diff ered 
from the opportunities for integration that were off ered by 
the Syrian government’s policies towards Iraqis. Th e ease 
with which Iraqi children could register with and attend 
Syrian schools stood in stark contradictions to the portrayal 
of these children by INGO texts and programs. Th e Syrian 
government did not mobilize elements of the state (in this 
case the education system) to systematically exclude Iraqis 
and in this way demonstrate the unity and homogeneity of 
the Syrian national population. Such exclusions were not 
an integral part of the repertoire of power through which 
the Syrian government emphasized the state’s sovereignty. 
Instead, this sovereignty was created through practices of 
insecurity and violence that applied to everyone residing 
on Syrian territory, be they Syrian or foreign passport hold-
ers. Th ese contradictions demonstrated how humanitarian 
approaches to population management can transform the 
way governments view and act upon migration and can 
introduce diff erent, more subtle forms of power through 
which the order of state sovereignty is created and main-
tained. Yet the Syrian situation, in which INGOs also had 
to adapt to requirements by the Syrian government, also 
highlighted that such changes occurred through dynamic 
exchange, in which both sides infl uenced each other’s room 
to operate.
3. Semi-offi  cial and Unoffi  cial INGOs
In addition to the large, professional INGOs described 
above, in 2009–10 a number of organizations operated aid 
projects for Iraqis in Damascus that were neither offi  cially 
registered with the Syrian government nor reliant on pro-
fessional staff . Th ese organizations did not maintain regular, 
close contact with Syrian ministries; their staff  possessed 
a deeper, more intuitive knowledge of Syrian government 
red lines, and were open to meeting me as a researcher and 
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allowing me to participate in and observe their programs. 
All organizations maintained a very low profi le.
Iraqi Student Project
Th e “semi-offi  cial” INGO that I had closest access to, and 
which was the most intriguing of all, was an organization 
called Iraqi Student Project (ISP). Th is organization had 
been set up by a retired couple from the US, to help gift ed 
Iraqi high school graduates receive scholarships to liberal 
arts colleges in the US. Apart from a single paid employee in 
the US, where ISP was registered as a non-profi t organization, 
this INGO was funded entirely through the couple’s income 
from social security and donations of time and money from 
a small group of supporters in the US and Syria.25 Th e 
organization was run out of the couple’s rented, two-bed-
room fl at in central Damascus, which functioned as a live/
work space, where volunteer teachers—oft en American or 
British TOEFL teachers working at the American Language 
Institute close by—ran classes to prepare the selected stu-
dents for their study and life in the US.26
Th e central fascination that developed from the partici-
pant-observation at ISP concerned the intense and com-
plicated power dynamics between the elderly directors, 
the volunteers, and the young Iraqi students. Aft er several 
severe confl icts at the organization, in which students were 
expelled from the program for unclear reasons, I became 
aware of how the power imbalance between directors and 
students worked underneath the egalitarian and peace-
ful veneer. Given this article’s focus on the construction of 
sovereignty through INGO programs, the following para-
graphs aim to tease out how ideas and practices of sover-
eignty were present in the relationships at ISP.
Th e selection process for students was based on sev-
eral standard items, such as being Iraqi, not having been 
accepted for UNHCR resettlement, having a good school 
record, and expressing an interest to return to Iraq aft er 
fi nishing college to contribute to the country’s future. In 
addition, selection depended on assessments of the candi-
date’s family environment, his/her psychological stability, 
and potential for coping alone in a foreign country. Th ese 
assessments were carried out in a relatively informal man-
ner by the two directors, through home visits and inter-
views. If selected, candidates joined a program of classes 
and were subjected to continuing, broadly informal mon-
itoring by the directors and volunteer teachers. Should a 
student become considered as “not ready,” she or he could 
be required to complete a further year of program, or could 
be expelled at any time.
Th e personal nature of these assessments is illustrated by 
the fi eld note excerpt below, reporting a conversation with 
one of the directors about several of the students (all names 
have been changed):
He talked about Ibrahim and how he was such a great kid. “Th is 
guy’s essays, they are just so good, his use of English. … If I could 
speak directly to any of the people in admission at the colleges, I 
would really tell him to take this guy, he’s just going to take off  and 
fl ourish over there.” It’s clear that Ibrahim is one of the director’s 
favourites and I just can’t get it out of my head that it has to do 
with his pretty tough story of 1.5 years in poverty in Jordan, dur-
ing which he was alone with his father and had to take care of the 
household etc. ( … )
He named Radi as one of the students that he had some doubts 
about having the maturity to success “once he is alone over there”. 
While he acknowledged that Radi was very passionate about his 
subject and very good in class in getting the others to participate, 
he somehow doubted that Radi had the toughness to “hack it” 
once out there in the states by himself. I was quite surprised by 
this assessment, as Radi lives on his own in Syria and is managing 
his aff airs by himself, and while there is indeed something quite 
“young” about him, I personally defi nitely found him quite tough 
and grounded.27
Th e two directors’ personal view of students held enor-
mous sway over their future, as most students considered 
their success in the program as monumentally important. 
One Iraqi young woman described how, at the time that 
she was being considered for ISP, her alternative option 
would have been a job as a waitress in one of the new malls 
of Damascus, highlighting how the chance to complete a 
university degree in the US was an extremely desirable exit 
from a dead-end existence in Syria. Th is desire to succeed, 
coupled with the arbitrary and personal control exercised 
by the program directors, created pressure to conform. Th e 
following extract from a conversation with one of the Iraqi 
students, which occurred in the immediate aft ermath of the 
sudden and unexpected dismissal of another student, high-
lights this situation.
Th e thing with Hussein was such a shock. With Huda, ok, it was 
kind of predictable that they wanted to kick her out, but with 
Hassan it was a complete shock. Everyone likes him, he is such 
a friendly and smart guy. And they did not give him a warning. 
Aft er this, everyone feels insecure, no one knows what is going to 
happen. ( … )
I feel so afraid now. Do we have to depend on her moods? 
Everything can change, I don’t know how to behave so that she 
likes me. Today when she said something about my trousers, I 
thought oh no, I’m not going to wear these trousers again. Does 
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she not like my hair the way it is? Does she not like my nose today? 
Or if I write an essay that she does not like … First we were under 
pressure in Iraq, then we were under the pressure of the Syrian 
government, when we don’t know whether they will kick the 
Iraqis out and now we are under the pressure of ISP.28
Th is statement crystallizes how personal relationships at 
the program were fused with wider, political relationships 
of sovereignty that strongly infl uenced the power dynamics 
at work. Th e nature of the relationships at ISP could only 
be explained with reference to the material and imagined 
realities of sovereignty, indeed they were sovereignty in the 
sense that they replicated and confi rmed the particular div-
isions of territory, population, and government that lie at 
sovereignty’s heart. Materially, the power exercised by the 
ISP directors was directly linked to their US citizenship 
which, in accordance with sovereignty, bonded them to 
the US government, which provided them with the money 
required to run their organization. Th eir security and power 
was inversely refl ected by the insecurity and weakness of 
the Iraqi students, whose Iraqi citizenship bonded them to 
the Iraqi government, which provided them with neither 
opportunities nor money. In this way, the ISP program 
reinforced and magnifi ed the sovereign ideal in an environ-
ment in which Iraqi migration in fact oft en blurred it.
Th e constructions of sovereignty on the level of imagina-
tion and ideas that emerged at ISP were much harder to pin 
down, and full of contradictions. Students were frequently 
encouraged to express their national pride as Iraqis, and 
numerous books about Iraq’s rich history and maps were 
displayed in the ISP fl at. But representations of Iraq as a 
place of destruction and hopelessness also abounded, in 
which the US appeared as a safe haven, the only chance for 
these students to lead meaningful lives. Th e ISP directors 
were frequently cynical and critical about US politics in 
the Middle East, but strongly celebrated other instances of 
US culture, such as the 1960s peace movement (which they 
remembered fondly) and the civil rights campaigns, and 
encouraged the students to celebrate these too. Students 
were also encouraged to abandon certain cultural traits, 
and there was a narrow framework of behaviour that made 
someone a “good ISP kid.” Th e following extracts from con-
versations with the ISP directors develop some of the com-
plex understandings of the US and Iraq as separate spaces 
that were present throughout the ISP programs:
Th e students get taught for one year by voluntary teachers to 
improve their English and to prepare them for the way teaching is 
done in the US. In Iraq, students generally learn information off  
by heart and reproduce it in the text. In the US, they have to learn 
critical thinking and analysis and to write good essays. Th ere are 
classes every day. Once a week my wife [one of the directors] does 
a writer’s workshop which focuses on essay writing skills. [ … ]
For many Americans it is an experience to meet an Iraqi. It 
becomes a real place for them. One of our students was at immi-
gration, when the offi  cer stopped short at the passport and did 
a double take, then expressed surprise that this girl, who does 
not wear the hijab and wears modern clothes, could be from Iraq. 
“You can walk around like that in Iraq?” Yes you can. “Is that a tat-
too?” Yes. “You can have a tattoo in Iraq?” Yes you can.29
Iraq and the US emerged as two distinct educational 
spaces, in which knowledge and knowledge-production 
functioned, were understood, and were valued diff erently. 
In order to succeed in the US, the students had to abandon 
aspects of their previous, “Iraqi” learning and acquire new 
modes of knowledge and thinking. Modern state sover-
eignty closely links knowledge-production to questions of 
legitimacy and government. Distinct epistemologies con-
nect citizens to the imagined sovereign in a particular way 
and establish the citizen’s home-state as diff erent (and oft en 
better) than all other states; the fundamental boundaries of 
security and global hierarchy are established through dis-
courses about what constitutes valuable, useful, dynamic 
and creative learning and knowledge, as much as through 
other media.30 In this sense, knowledge and education have 
replaced, or have been added to, oaths of allegiance and/
or religion as ways of connecting populations with their 
rulers.31
Such distinct forms of knowledge became visible at ISP 
seminars, during discussions about representations of Iraq 
and the schooling the students had experienced in the past. 
Th e recordings of a number of classes showed that, of course, 
Iraqis did indeed learn a form of “critical thinking” in Iraqi 
schools; however its form and content would probably be 
dismissed as uncritical and simplistic anti-Western propa-
ganda by most “Western” observers. Most of the students 
refl ected critically themselves on the image of a rapacious 
and imperialist US waiting to steal Iraq’s oil they had been 
taught.32 Crucially, these observations demonstrated that 
knowledge and its content were linked to territory and gov-
ernment, and were forms of power controlled by state insti-
tutions, through which the state’s sovereignty and the unity 
of its government, population, and territory were created 
and demonstrated. To “fi t in” and succeed at US colleges, 
Iraqi students had to acquire the modes of knowledge pro-
duction intimately tied to US sovereignty, that indicated US 
territory as a separate physical and conceptual space. It was 
remarkable that the ISP directors considered it necessary 
that the students at ISP (who had already been preselected 
according to criteria of education and personality that made 
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them conform more with US college life) received months 
of training to achieve an appropriate standard; their experi-
ence of several students failing in the US had taught them 
that students needed much more than English language 
training to “make it.”
Native without a Nation
In a diff erent way, education also played a central role for 
the activities of the small, informal INGO Native without a 
Nation (NWN), created and run principally by an Iraqi man 
called Firas. NWN’s activities, which consisted of IT-skills 
and creative workshops for children and teenagers, home 
visits to depressed and/or hard-up families, and Skype 
exchanges between Iraqi and US youngsters, had developed 
out of Firas’s personal social activism since his arrival in 
Syria in 2006. Further, NWN ran a website, on which Iraqi 
teenagers could publish their stories and art work.33 A small 
group of US-based supporters helped organize the Internet 
exchanges with a school in upstate New York, US; fund-
ing was restricted to occasional donations of equipment 
from friends and small cash donations.34 Although NWN’s 
projects helped Iraqis, thus making a distinction based on 
national identity, the organization’s close focus on personal 
narratives, friendship, and non-judgmental compassion 
made it an example of international solidarity that did not 
depend on reconstructions of the sovereign ideal or the cat-
egorization of people into sovereign types.
Although (or because) Firas, who had in-depth personal 
experience of UNHCR’s application of sovereignty, and that 
of the Syrian state, was heavily aff ected by all manner of 
sovereign regulations, NWN’s “humanitarian” activities 
emphasized personal expressions of the persons involved 
in the projects. Th ere was little or no indication that broad 
assumptions were drawn about people’s “needs” or devia-
tions due to the categories, values, and exclusions of sover-
eignty. NWN’s website presented the stories of some partici-
pants without judgment-laden introductions or texts about 
the situation of Iraqis as such, their illegality, and so forth.35 
Many narratives concerned memories of violence experi-
enced in Baghdad, but many also articulated instances of 
empowerment and independence. One of Firas’s stated aims 
was to develop a platform for young Iraqi people to express 
themselves in their own words and thoughts. Th e follow-
ing quotes from the website illustrate their diversity and the 
aim of self-expression:
Othman Abd Al-Rahman Mohammad
My name is Othman Abd Al-Rahman Mohammad. I am an Iraq 
pupil and I am proud of being an Iraqi. Despite the fact that I live 
in my second country Syria, I love this country so much as well as 
its generous people.
I love to study in a perfect way. I love my school, my family and my 
relatives who are away from me due to the cruel circumstances. I 
also love helping my father with the housework.
From Noor, Muna and Anfal
Since the fi rst art show we had in Damascus, we felt admiration 
and encouragement from the audience to continue painting, and 
talk about the mixtures of colors. We were oft en asked if we ever 
went to art schools. Th e answer always is “ We never studied art, 
it’s just what we do and like to do. We do express what we feel 
and we convert it on our paintings.” ( … ) At the end of the meet-
ing we agreed that we have to be strong and keep getting better. 
We noticed the diff erence between the fi rst and last art show, our 
paintings became stronger and more expressive through the sub-
jects and the colors. Every painting had story. Now we are prepar-
ing for another art show, with new paintings, new stories, and new 
style.
We will never stop looking forward. We will never be silent.
Mustafa, 17
( … )
I will never forget that accident. I no more want to be in Iraq so 
that I don’t have to face any of this again. Th at doesn’t make my 
situation any easier as I have heart failure and the medical care is 
basically non-existent. All I hope for is to know my future aft er 
registering with the UNHCR as a refugee.36
Sovereignty’s divisions are not absent from these self-
representations, and sovereign boundaries, both physical 
and imagined, structure the thoughts and practices of these 
young people. However the key point concerning NWN’s 
activities was that they did not reproduce or use sovereignty 
as a reference point in the same way as other INGOs; they 
did not contain regulations or classifi cations according to 
people’s position vis-à-vis an assumed, protective sover-
eign. NWN did not run programs that were predesigned 
according to ideas about refugees based on the sovereign 
ideal. NWN’s semi-spontaneous interventions relied on in-
depth personal knowledge of persons who were interested 
in support. Rather than aiming to guide or change these 
lives in any particular direction, this support created small 
instances of success or positive feelings, which empowered 
people to continue struggling against the oft en overwhelm-
ing way in which sovereignty’s exclusions were aff ecting 
them. By ignoring sovereignty’s framework in these small 
ways, NWN’s practices used an alternative lens through 
which Iraqis in Syria were not consistently recast as outside 
sovereignty, but simply as fellow humans who had fallen on 
hard times.
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A similar dynamic could be observed during the web 
conferences that NWN organized between Iraqi youth in 
Damascus and a school class in upstate New York, US. Th ese 
conferences, held about every six months, were conducted 
via the Internet-telephony program Skype, and included 
video-calling, so that the partaking individuals could see 
each other. During the calls, the children and teenagers 
would introduce themselves and show each other art work 
they had made, or narrate items they had recently studied. 
Th e focus on shared, enjoyable activities among individuals 
(rather than divisive, negative experiences of imagined col-
lectives) created a basis of understanding of one another’s 
humanness, regardless of sovereignty’s territorial, govern-
mental, and population divisions. Th e empowering aspect 
of the Internet’s territory-undermining technology, which 
can create non-territorial communities and nations, was a 
crucial aspect for this project.
4. Conclusion
Research conducted among INGOs in Damascus in 2009–
10 found that most INGO activities were based on and pro-
moted modern state sovereignty as the normal, safe, and 
correct form of political organization. Iraqis in Syria, who 
were the raison d’être for INGOs’ presence in Syria in the 
fi rst place, were continuously depicted and treated as alien, 
illegal, and helpless, due to their location outside of the ter-
ritory that their nationality allocated to them. Rather than 
considering Iraqi life in Syria as an indication for the fi ction 
and weakness of the assumed unity of population, territory, 
and government, INGO activities consistently portrayed 
it as an instance in which this unity had been tragically 
broken. From this perspective, Iraqis in Syria could never 
be regarded as normal instances of human life, but were 
necessarily cast as deviant and in need of protection and 
correction through INGO interventions.
Th e rich ethnographic detail provided throughout this 
article demonstrated how highly personalized interactions, 
and social programs focused on areas of life ostensibly out-
side of the remit of state intervention, contributed to the 
maintenance of state sovereignty’s political, social, and 
spatial organization. Unlike the frequent assumption, state 
sovereignty not only was upheld through power exercised 
by state institutions, but, in the case of international NGOS, 
was carried out through diff use and non-violent tech-
niques of power that were much harder to discern than, for 
example, the highly visible violence exercised by the Syrian 
government as a means of creating sovereignty.
Research found that INGOs conducting aid projects for 
Iraqis broadly fell into two separate groups. Th e fi rst group 
consisted of around a dozen professional and offi  cially 
registered organizations, such as Danish Refugee Council 
or International Rescue Committee. Th ese INGOs were 
established members of the global, professional humanitar-
ian sector and had standard procedures and regulations on 
how to set up projects, raise and organize funds, publish 
annual reports, recruit staff , and so on. Th e language and 
programming of these organizations were fully sovereignty-
conform; this was particularly visible from the highly select-
ive portrayal of Iraqi life in exile, from the INGOs’ tense 
relationship with the Syrian state that revealed transforma-
tion to how sovereignty was exercised on Syrian territory, 
and from their dependence on funding from North Atlantic 
states that carried with it a narrow framework of action.
Th e second group of INGOs was typifi ed by their infor-
mality, their lack of offi  cial registration with state author-
ities, and their reliance on volunteers rather than paid pro-
fessionals. Th is divergent group of organizations included 
a semi-professional INGO with several dozens of volun-
teers as well as one-man outfi ts with little external support. 
Consequently, these organizations’ position towards sover-
eignty was eclectic. One organization, focused on helping 
young Iraqis access US colleges, demonstrated how educa-
tion and knowledge was linked to sovereignty, as Iraq and 
the US were understood as separated by diff erent epistem-
ologies and forms of learning. Here, educational practice 
was revealed as linking citizens to territory and government, 
according to rules set by the state. A second informal INGO 
ran projects emphasizing the commonalities among Iraqi 
and US youth, without reifying Iraqi life in exile accord-
ing to familiar humanitarian tropes. In this way, sovereign 
exclusions were overcome by simple expressions of human 
solidarity and by a form of organization in which roles of 
provider and benefi ciary, of leader and led, were blurred 
and unclear.
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